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BOOK REVIEWS
PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER OIL RESOURCES. A STUDY OF MIDDLE
EAST OIL CONCESSIONS AND LEGAL CHANGE. By Muhamad A.

Mughraby. Beirut, Lebanon: The Middle East Research and Publishing Center. 1966. Pp. xviii, 233. $7.00.
THE EVOLUTION OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA. By Henry Cattan. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana

Publications, Inc., for the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law. 1967. Pp. xvi, 173. $7.50.
THE LAW OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA. By Henry Cattan. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publica-

tions, Inc., for the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law.
1967. Pp. xiv, 200. $7.50.
A learned colleague complained recently that he found it difficult to
pursue his study of the international legal problems of expropriation of
foreign property "without being almost constantly distracted by petroleum
fumes."' Readers of the by now quite voluminous literature on the
treatment and protection of private foreign investment in developing
countries will surely share this feeling. The problems of oil investments
abroad have dominated to an extraordinary extent the legal debate and
literature in this area. Lawyers associated, in whatever manner, with oil
companies were among the first to perceive the presence and importance
of current trends and attitudes regarding respect for contract and private
property. As a result, they were among the earliest, and have continued
to be among the most vocal, advocates of increased legal protection of
foreign interests in developing countries. The spokesmen for the developing countries, on the other hand, have often argued their case, explicitly
or implicitly, by reference to investments in oil or other natural resources.
The rhetoric at international conferences and organizations has often
reflected such concerns. Even with respect to the limited current judicial
practice, a similar bias obtains: most of the few postwar arbitrations
worthy of being cited in discussions of private foreign investment problems-from the Abu Dhabi2 and Qatar3 cases to the Arantco' and
1. Baade, Pernent
Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, in ESSAYS
ON EXPROPRIATION 3, 17 (R. Miller and R. Stanger ed., 1967).
2. Petroleum Developments (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi
(1951) (arbitration award), 1 INT'i & Coup. L.Q. 247 (1952).
3. Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Co., Ltd. (1953) (arbitration award),

20 I.L.R. 534 (1957).
4.

Government of Saudi Arabia v. Aramco

(1958)

(arbitration

award),
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Sapphire Co.5 arbitrations-relate to petroleum.
Concern with petroleum and petroleum investments is certainly not
unjustified in view of their overwhelming importance for oil companies,
oil-producing countries, and most other nations, which are consumers of
the product. With reference to the United States, the importance of the
oil industry, both domestic and foreign, needs little elaboration.6 Petroleum investment has been for a long time the single most important
category of United States foreign investment. At the end of 1966, total
United States direct investment abroad amounted to nearly fifty-five
billion dollars; over sixteen billion of this, or just under thirty percent,
was in petroleum. The proportion is higher when only investment in less
developed countries is considered; of a total of about sixteen billion
dollars at the end of 1966, petroleum investment accounted for over
seven billion, nearly forty-five percent.'
Aside from its economic significance, the petroleum industry is a
particularly appropriate subject for the study of legal and other problems
of foreign private investment in developing countries. Despite its size in
financial terms, this is after all a limited industry, with relatively few
participants on either side (at least as far as production and marketing, as
distinguished from consumption, are concerned). Moreover, the problems
which arise in connection with petroleum are of vital importance to
participants and are, therefore, highly visible and the objects of deliberate
action on the part of companies and host countries. Most recent developments can be easily perceived and described in the microcosm of the oil
industry: the increasing awareness on the part of less developed countries
of the need for control over and increased benefit from their natural
resources and their increasing power to impose conditions more to their
advantage on private companies; the range of methods used to bring
about such results, from requests and suggestions, to negotiations and
agreed amendments, to boycotts, nationalizations and other radical measures; and overall, the continuing cooperation between private investors
and host countries, the former in pursuit of profit, the latter in pursuit
of enrichment of their governing elites or in search of economic developI.L.R. 117 (1963).
5. Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co. (1963)
(arbitration award), 35 I.L.R. 136 (1967).
6. For a stimulating study, somewhat impressionistic in its discussion of the
international aspect, see R. ENGLER, THE PoLITIcs OF OIL: PIVATE POWER AND
An excellent discussion of "the international oil
DESmocRATIc DIRacTioNs (1961).
industry in its political environment," is J. HARTSHOm, OIL COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as HARTSHORN].
7. Rough calculations on the basis of the figures given by Lederer and Cutler,
International Investments of the United States in 1966, 47 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus.
Sept. 1967, at 39.
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ment. The factors responsible for these developments are also fairly
easily apparent: political changes, changes in attitude, shifts in the
allocation of power, progress in technology. In an introductory survey
to one of the books under review, Dr. Cattan lists six "major developments which have influenced the course of the evolution of oil concessions": the equal sharing of oil profits, the concept of relinquishment of
lands conceded but not developed, participation of the host government
in the industry, the grant of offshore concessions in territorial waters and
in the continental shelf made possible by technological advances, the
enactment of national petroleum legislation, and the establishment of
national and international agencies concerned with the oil industry.'
Political or even cultural changes are also important, of course, such as,
in the present context, the changes in the political regimes of several
Middle Eastern countries and the transformation of the international
situation. These developments clearly parallel those that have occurred,
at various degrees of intensity and with varying extent of success, in all
areas of contact between developed and less developed countries and
between foreign investors and host countries.
On the other hand, the oil industry remains an essentially peculiar
industry. Conclusions to be drawn from a study of its operations can be
applied only with difficulty and with many qualifications to other areas,
especially to areas not involving extraction of natural resources. The
size of the investments at stake, the strategic value of the product for the
states concerned (state of nationality of company owners, consumer
states, host states), the vital importance of this single product for the very
few producing states, the peculiar if romantic history of relationships between companies and producers in the not so distant past, are all factors
which differentiate oil investments from investments in manufacturing
and from most other operations of foreign private investors in developing
countries. The discussion, therefore, of the problems of foreign investment by reference, exclusively or principally, to the problems of the oil
industry distorts the focus of legal literature and debate. Although some
basic problems remain the same for all investments in developing
countries, many other problems differ radically. Such distortion occurs
whatever the side from which one looks at problems-the risk of
expropriation or cancellation of contract does not obtain for manufacturing investments to the same extent that it does for oil; on the other
hand, the need for regulation or control in order to maintain or reestablish national sovereignty over resources obtains in different manners

S. H.

CATTAN, THE EVOLUTION OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA

6-25 (1967)

[hereinafter cited as CATTAN, EVOLUTION].
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in the case of oil and in that of manufacturing investments.'
These background facts explain why the appearance of the books
under review is particularly welcome. They deal specifically and in detail
with the legal aspects of oil investments and they do not pretend to cover
the whole area of foreign investment, nor do they extend their conclusions
to any other aspects of the foreign investment area. Although they are
not the first studies of the law of oil concessions, they are without any
doubt the most systematic and exhaustive. As their titles make clear,
the two authors cover, the one in a single book and the other in two,
largely the same subject matter. The main thrust of their respective books,
however, is different as is their attitude toward law in general and toward
the function of law in that particular area.
Although it is not my intention to compare the two books paragraph
by paragraph or even chapter by chapter, a general comparison of the
distinctive approaches and concerns of the two authors is quite instructive. The most convenient way to start is by a brief outline of the basic
structure of their respective works.
Dr. Mughraby ° starts with a short and very general chapter on
"national economic development and international economic disintegration," intended to provide some basic economic and historical background. He begins to deal in concreto with his topic in the second
chapter, where he analyzes carefully the evolution of the legal concept of
"permanent sovereignty over natural resources," especially within the
United Nations.1 ' From that point, he begins his argument: to reestablish their national sovereignty over oil resources, the host countries
have acted in two main directions. First, they have sought to secure
"control from within" through insistence on joint ventures involving a
partnership between foreign investor and host government in the ownership and operation of oil companies. Part Two of Dr. Mughraby's book
is devoted to the study of "the concept of legal-economic partnership";
it is essentially an overview of such joint ventures in the Middle East
oil industry, followed by a detailed analysis of recent joint venture agreements in two countries, Iran and the UAR. In the second place, oilproducing countries have tried to exercise "control from without" through
bargaining with the oil companies. But there is now a new element, in
that the host countries are acting collectively, through the Organization
9.

See Ebb, Private Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, in DEVELOPINTERNATIONAL
LAW AND
EcoNoMics 63, 64 (Armstrong ed. 1967); cf.
Financing of Economic Development: Promotion of Private Foreign Investnent in
Developing Countries, Summary and Conclusions, at 16-17, UN Doe. E/4293 (1967).
10. M. MUGHRA Y, PERMAINENT SovEREIGNTr OVER OIL R SOURCES (1966) [hereMENT:

inafter cited as MuTJRABY].
11. Cf. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217

(1962).
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of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The author discusses in
some detail the structure and status of the Organization and describes the
bargaining over a particular issue. The Fourth Part of the book, on "permanent sovereignty and legal change," contains the author's conclusions;
he advances the concept of "mutual equivalence of contractual advantages"
as the basis for a dynamic conception of evolving long-range relationships between host countries and oil companies.
Dr. Cattan's two books do not offer as clearly a thesis or an
argument, although they do represent a well-reasoned and fairly welldefined position on the related issues, comparable though often opposed
to Dr. Mughraby's. In the Evolution of Oil Concessions, Dr. Cattan
starts with a "historical review," already noted for its useful summary
of major developments since 1950. He then embarks on a clause-byclause analysis first of the financial conditions and then of the general
conditions of oil concessions; the detail and clarity of his exposition
must be particularly stressed-this is a most helpful introduction to
the complexities of oil concession terminology and methods. The book
finishes with a discussion of host government participation in the oil
industry, which consists in large part of descriptions of related experiences
in the UAR and Iran. The second of Dr. Cattan's books,12 devoted to the
law of oil concessions, is divided into two uneven parts, dealing respectively with the "legal rules and principles relative to oil concessions,"
and with the problems of dispute settlement. The first and longer part
starts with a general discussion of "state contracts" (contracts between a
state and a person not its national) and then deals more specifically
with the legal "nature" of oil concessions. The next chapter covers at
length the applicable law and the manner in which it is chosen. In the
remainder of that part the author examines the problems of the legal
order in (or under) which oil concessions, or some of them, are concluded and operate, and the mutual equivalence of benefits as a legal
principle governing oil concessions. The second part covers briefly conciliation procedures and deals in detail with the procedures and problems
of arbitration.
Even so rough an outline indicates some basic similarities and
differences between the two authors. They cover in the main the same
subjects, although they attribute differing importance to particular issues.
They are both essentially moderate, in legal or political terms, in that
they approach pragmatically the basic problems of the area. Neither
adopts a really extreme position, either on the side of the host countries
or on that of the oil companies, although each of them inclines, in effect
12. H. CATTAN,
NORTH AFRICA (1967)

THE LAW OF

OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE
CATTAN, LAW].

[hereinafter cited as

EAST AND
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if not in intention, toward one of these sides. Dr. Mughraby rejects outright nationalization as a desirable course of action for the host countries
on clearly pragmatic grounds: "[fit is beyond dispute that national
governments cannot, at present, afford either the capital, the know-how
or the marketing outlets .... Hence, [nationalization] is not a workable

solution for many years to come."13 Dr. Cattan, on the other side,
although stressing "sanctity of contract," is obviously aware and in no
way disapproving of the whole process of negotiations, pressure and
counterpressure, and continuous change, which is the actual context of
the operation of oil concessions.
On the other hand, and in view of these similarities, their approach
to law and to legal process could hardly be more different. Dr. Mughraby
is concerned with the process of legal change, its goals, methods, and
possibilities. He advances an interpretation of recent developments which
imports some unity to otherwise diverse and fragmented events. He
further presents an articulated theory for the general area ("permanent
sovereignty") as well as for the particular legal problem of oil concessions
("mutual equivalence"). Dr. Cattan, on the other hand, is essentially
interested in the law "as it is." He is clearly aware of, and quite obviously
knowledgeable in, the political, economic, and other forces involved but
he does not deal with them except incidentally; his is an essentially
static view. Perhaps the symbol of his approach is the division of his
study into two parts, presumably independent although related, one
dealing with the substance of oil concessions and its evolution and the
other with the form-the "law." Dr. Cattan chooses not to treat his
subject as a never-ending process of agreement, negotiation, operation,
adjustment, and readjustment to rapidly changing social, economic, and
technological conditions. He sees and describes instead particular provisions from a succession of oil concessions, casually mentioning occasionally some reasons for the changes without any attempt to derive conclusions or to present theories. He has collected materials for comparison
between contracts but does not himself engage to any serious extent in
the actual comparisons. That this is a quite respectable and defensible
attitude goes without saying. At the same time, two points must be made:
first, such an approach provides little orientation or guidance to the reader
as to future developments in a rapidly changing industry; second, in the
particular historical context of the oil industry, a static approach tends
to inure to the benefit of one side, namely, the oil companies. If the latter
point is not self-evident, some of the discussion in the balance of this
review should provide support and clarification.
13.

MuGHRABY

53-54.
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As already noted, both authors discuss at length the modalities and,
to a lesser extent, the problems of government participation in oil
production in association with oil companies. Dr. Cattan's description'
is perhaps more exhaustive, and he deals with one recent case, that of the
Franco-Algerian Cooperative Association, which presumably crystallized
too late for Dr. Mughraby to include in his study. On the other hand, the
latter is interested, at least in part, in the manner in which the ventures,
once established, have actually worked: he provides in that connection
an interesting and significant review of the effects of bringing a joint
venture into the "public sector" in the United Arab Republic. 1
Government participation in joint ventures is certainly an important
recent development and the trend in its direction is quite definitely
continuing. In early April 1968, for instance, an agreement in principle
was announced between the Government of Libya and the French
(state-owned) companies Sociftj Nationale des Pdtroles d'Aquitaive and
Entreprise de Reclwrclhes et d'Activitis Pgtroli~res for the formation
of "an association ...

for research and exploitation."' 6 This will be the

first such joint venture in which the Libyan Government participates.
Still, this is not a unique or even a particularly original method of imposing governmental controls over vital sectors of the economy. Dr. Cattan
reminds us indeed that government participation on the oil-consumers'
side is quite common: witness the partial or total ownership by the
British, French, and Italian governments of their respective oil companies."7 A far more original and thereby interesting recent departure
from the established patterns of action has been the attempt at collective
decision-making and action on the part of oil-producing countries through
the creation in 1960 of OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries, which now has nine members.'" It is characteristic of Dr. Cattan's approach that he deals with this major development
rather casually, devoting a page and a half to discussion of the creation
and structure of OPEC" and incidentally referring to it in connection
with particular points and provisions in oil concessions as to which
OPEC has established policies.2"
14. CATTAN, EVOLUTION 121-51.
15. MUGHRABY 74-75.

16. See 12 MIDDLE EAST EcoN. DIGEST 300 (1968).
17. CATrAN, EVOLUTION 127. For a discussion of the role of consumer countries'
governments in international oil affairs, see HARTsiEroRN 255-67.
18. Abu Dhabi, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and

Venezuela. For some recent discussions of OPEC, see, in addition to

MuGHraBY 124
ff., HARTSHORN 335-48 and D. HiRsT, OIL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

100-19 (1966).
19.

CATrAN, EVOLUTION 23-25.

20. Id. 41, 54-55, 97, 105.
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For Dr. Mughraby, as already indicated, the creation and operation
of OPEC constitute the second main direction followed by the host
countries in seeking to re-establish control over their oil resources. 2
He develops in this connection a number of theories or suggestions,
the most interesting of which is the submission that OPEC constitutes
an organ of "transnational collective bargaining," analogous to trade
unions in the domestic legal order. The microcosm of oil again reflects
here large-scale developments: the "group of seventy-seven" in the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development may be understood in similar terms, although the difference in size and area of
operations is, of course, a quite significant differentiating factor. Dr.
Mughraby may indeed go a little too far in his attempt to establish a
precise analogy between collective bargaining in the area of domestic
industrial relations and the operation of OPEC in the international oil
industry. The broad analogy is sufficiently arresting in itself to be useful,
with no need for further argumentation, or for establishing exact
correspondence between the two in terms of their dealing with basic
factors of production or other such rather elementary economic propositions. In concluding his discussion of the analogy, the author stresses that
in the international environment, where no protective legislation for the
weaker members of the community is possible, "a greater degree of freedom of contract between economically weak and economically powerful
parties" can be achieved "only by the resort of the weaker party to collective action through voluntary collaboration with other weak parties sharing the same economic objectives."2 2 From these findings, he deduces
the "significance of economic interest as the most important unifying
factor in international legal relations." 2 To bolster his argument, he
narrates in some detail the story of the bargaining over "royalty expensing."" This is a most instructive case, both as an illustration of the
operation of OPEC as a unified group and as an indication of the
achievement of limited objectives through compromise rather than insistence on far reaching goals and direct confrontation.
21.
22.

MUGIRABY 119-57.
MUGHRABY 154.

23. Id.
24. Until the early 'sixties the uniform practice in financial relations between
oil companies and host governments had been to treat royalty payments as part of the
total fixed proportion of profits due to the host state and, therefore, to treat them
as credits against tax liabilities. At their fourth Conference, in 1963, the OPEC
countries recommended that each member country should initiate negotiations with the
oil companies concerned "with a view to working out a formula whereunder royalty
payments shall be fixed at a uniform rate which Members consider equitable and shall
not be treated as a credit against income tax liability." OPEC, Resolution IV.33.
Complex negotiations followed, detailed in MUGHRABY at 140-49, which resulted in a
compromise, accepted by now in most petroleum-producing countries. See also HARTSHORN

341-43;

CATTAN, EVOLUTION

41.
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Since publication of Dr. Mughraby's book, another major operation
under the auspices of OPEC has taken place, this time in Libya." In
late 1965, the Libyan Government asked the oil companies already
operating in the country on the basis of earlier concessions to accept
amendment of the concessionary terms to provide for expensing of
royalties and for a change in the method of computing tax payments,
both resulting in considerably higher tax liabilities for the companies.
From the very start, several companies agreed to the new terms; a
number of others, however, were quite unwilling to amend their
earlier concessions-which had already been amended once, as a result of
the amendment of the Libyan Petroleum Law in 1961. To persuade the
recalcitrant companies, the Government used four major "arguments":
first, the new amendments to its oil law provided that no new concession
would be granted to companies refusing to amend their earlier concessions in accordance with the new terms;2 second, it promised to
accept without further dispute the tax declarations for earlier years of
any company consenting to the amendment, thus eliminating a serious
possibility of charging the companies for additional taxes; third, OPEC
issued a resolution, published after the end of the negotiations but
appropriately leaked before the final capitulation of the companies, to
the effect that no member country would issue new concessions to a
company (or a parent or subsidiary thereof) which did not agree to
amend its earlier concessions as proposed by the Libyan government;2
and fourth, and last in time, the Libyan Government declared that it
might stop the exports of any company not agreeing to the amendment
of the oil concessions. How far this last threat, which would appear
essentially to involve a violation of existing contractual undertakings, was
decisive is subject to debate;2 8 at any rate, the measure was never taken
since the remainder of the companies capitulated in January 1966. The
action threatened brings to mind, of course, earlier measures or threats
of measures in violation of existing contracts in other petroleum-producing countries. But it is the first three measures that are of particular
interest as examples of sophisticated bargaining methods, through a
combination of offer and withholding of rewards rather than threat of
25. For a description and analysis of the Libyan "operation," see HARTSHORN 17-26.
Cf. the accounts in the trade journals, especially 63 OnL & GAS J., Oct. 18, 1965, at 70;
Nov. 1, 1965, at 48; and Dec. 20, 1965, at 49; 64 Or. & GAS J., Jan. 10, 1966, at 48-49;
Jan. 31, 1966, at 130-31; 32 PETROLEum PRESS SERvIcE 267-68, 427 (1965); 33 PETRoLEUM PREss SERVICE 7-9 (1966).
26.

in 5

See article XI of the Royal Decree Law, promulgated on November 22, 1965,

445, 454 (1966).
27. OPEC Resolution X. 63 in 5 INT'L L.
INT'L L. MATERIALS

MATERIALS

532 (1966).

28. It is interesting to note that this last measure, reported in HARTSHORN 18-19,
was not widely reported in the trade press. There is, for example, no reference to it in
the reports cited supra note 25.
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punitive action. Obviously, particular circumstances are controlling;
the importance of new concessions in Libya is greater than in some other
countries whose oil resources are already better developed. No special
point need be made of the third and most original of these measures, the
collective action on the part of members of OPEC; its potential importance is obvious.
All in all, OPEC has taken a rather moderate approach to the
problems of relations with oil companies. As a recent observer has noted:
[w]hat distinguishes OPEC in its dealing with the oil
companies from Arab governments in general is the thoroughness and consistency of its approach. . . . It is conscious that
by general Arab standards [its aims] are 'moderate' objectives,
capable of fulfilment, with give-and-take on both sides, through
In order to make further
normal channels of negotiation ....
progress,.., the technocrats had to go beyond the preconceived
generalities and essentially emotional arguments about 'exploitation' and 'monopoly' and make a study of the oil industry
in its broadest context and in painstaking detail. This was the
only way to counter the company's deliberately technical arguments against improving the producing countries' terms.2"
At the same time, OPEC has been quite effective in promoting the
immediate interests of its members. Its most recent success has been the
abolition of a 6.5 percent discount allowance, to which the major oil
companies agreed in January 1968; as a result, the governmental revenues
of the host countries were expected to increase by about 250 million
dollars a year."0
Success, however, breeds problems. Once its initial battles are won,
where is OPEC going? Its ultimate and clearly most significant objective
is the stabilization of prices and production."' But when that objective
is considered, certain fundamental problems arise. First, assuming that
companies will cooperate, how far can prices be pushed? Here is where a
third party, until now ignored in this review as it is in the books
reviewed, comes into play: the oil-consuming nations include in their
number some of the most powerful developed countries. It may be
unnecessary to waste too much sympathy on the oil companies, as the
"man-in-the middle"-they have too much power and ability to be proper
29. D. HIRST, supra note 18, at 108.
30. See 12 MIDDLE EAST ECoN. DIGEST 40 (1968).
31. See, e.g., a recent OPEC paper presented to the Sixth Arab Petroleum
Congress (March 1967), Collective Influence in the Recent Trend Toward the
Stabilization of International Crude and Product Prices. Cf. HARTSHORN 344-48.
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objects for sympathy. 2 Still, it is true that their production, pricing,
and distribution policies are affected by pressures on both the producing
and the consuming sides. Reference to the interests and possible action
of consumers completes the picture of the international oil industry and
makes clearer the existence of limits to the bargaining power of oil
producers. 3
A second, more immediate, problem is that cooperation among
producing countries cannot be taken for granted. Assuming relatively
stable total production, these countries would be (and are) competing
directly with one another in a zero-sum-game situation-what one gains
the other loses. Even under the traditional pattern of operation, host countries exert pressures on oil companies to increase production, although this
often entails decrease of production in other countries. Iranian pressure
on the Consortium for a continuing increase in oil production is only the
latest such example.34 The presence of national oil companies, or even
the collaboration between host governments and oil companies in production, exacerbates such competition. A perceptive reviewer of Dr.
Mughraby's book has already observed that
there is an implicit conflict between the role of OPEC and
the function of the joint venture agreements. OPEC signifies
a confrontation between united producing countries against
hostile foreign oil companies, whereas the joint venture scheme
depends on mutual cooperation between the country and the
oil company.33
In the context of competition between oil producing countries this
contradiction becomes particularly significant; it is no longer sufficient
to argue that joint ventures are appropriate for new agreements, while
OPEC and collective bargaining relate to the revision of older concessions." Distinctions in terms of new versus old arrangements are,
or will soon be, no longer valid. The old concessions have all by now
been revised, while several oil producing countries continue to grant new
concessions. It is the competition between producers in a relatively stable
market that lies at the root of the tension.
32. For a thoughtful review of this problem, see HARTsHoRx 375-88.
33. An OPEC official has suggested that a "possible long-term solution" would
be the establishment of "joint undertakings on an integrated basis between the Governments of producing countries and both the Governments of consuming countries and
foreign private enterprises." See F. PARuA, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER THE CONCESSION SYSTE1 IN NON-ImusTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 50 (1964).
34. See 12 MIDDLE EAST EcoN. DIGEST 265, 377 (1968); 34 PEmot0rM PRESS

SERvIcE 3 (1967).

35. Thompson, Book Review, 5
36. MUGHRABY 193.

ALBERTA

L. REv. 363, 364-65 (1967).
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Events in early 1968 have shown that differences in attitude and
general orientation among OPEC members remain very important. On
January 9, 1968, the formation of an Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was announced."7 Its members are
Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia; membership is open to any Arab
country for which petroleum "is the principal and basic source of national
income," but Iraq was invited to join and declined. The charter of the
new organization provides that:
The principal aim of the organization is the cooperation of
the members in various forms of economic activity in the oil industry, the realization of the closest ties between them in this
field, the determination of ways and means of safeguarding the
legitimate interests of its members, individually and collectively,
the unification of efforts in the industry to ensure the flow of
oil to its consumption markets on equitable and reasonable terms,
and the creation of a suitable climate for the capital and expertise invested in the oil industry in the member states.",
Its members say that OAPEC is intended to be a source of strength
for OPEC; its charter expressly binds its members to abide "by the
ratified resolutions of OPEC." However, there is little doubt that the
formation of OAPEC has, and was intended to have, political consequences. It appears to represent an attempt by the politically moderate
or conservative Arab nations to keep petroleum policies on an economic
and technical level and to avoid their being directly and extensively
affected by purely political-ideological or other-considerations (such
as those relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict)-in the words of an
expert, "to maintain a purely economic approach to the development of
the oil sector to the exclusion, as far as possible, of dangerous political
crosscurrents." 9 No open negative reaction has come from other OPEC
members. In fact, Venezuelan spokesmen applauded the creation of
OAPEC and declared that it should be expected to strengthen OPEC.
From Egypt, however, came a call for an association of Arab national
oil companies, to operate as a consortium either independently or in
joint ventures with foreign firms. Such a grouping, it was said, would
not conflict with OAPEC, and would in fact complement it, while, at the
same time, it would pave the way for a confrontation with the interna37. For up-to-date reports of related developments, see 12
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38. Agreement for the Establishment of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, signed on January 9, 1968, article 2, 7 INT'L L. MATERIALS 759 (1968).
39. Faud Itayim, editor Middle East Economic Survey, quoted in N.Y. Times,
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tional oil cartels.4" Some steps in this direction have already been taken
through several recent agreements on cooperation and coordination
among national Arab oil companies. While it would be premature and
unjustified to speak of a permanent split in OPEC, one must repeat that
despite the existence of common interests cooperation is no easy task.
In the context of such rapid change in the substance and form of
relationships between oil companies and host states, through complex
processes of negotiation and concomitant pressures and counterpressures,
is there anything left for the lawyer, except for a prudential assessment of
chances and probabilities, which any experienced observer could make as
well? Such negative first impressions are misleading. While concern for
judicial aspects may be, in the main, absent, negotiations and discussions
are conducted within a specific legal framework; legal principles and
instruments set outside limits; they often determine the starting point
from which the bargaining process begins; and they make clear some
consequences that the parties' actions entail. This is where the differences
in their conception of law and its role between the two authors under
review become relevant; for such differences affect in important ways the
shared understanding of the parties as to their initial bargaining position
and the courses of action open to them.
Legal argument has many functions and assumes many forms.
Some of the most basic differences between the two authors are symbolic
in nature; although symbols are not to be condemned, or excluded from
legal discourse, they must be understood and treated as such. To deal
with reality one must go beyond symbolic reference. Dr. Cattan emphasizes the importance of the contractual element in oil concessions;
while admitting the presence of "public law" elements, he insists that it
is as a sui generis contract that the oil concession in the Middle East
can be best understood.41 Dr. Mughraby, on the other hand, admits
casually the partly contractual character of concessions but stresses
instead the overriding concept of "permanent sovereignty over natural
resources." But sovereignty is today becoming more and more a sort of
residual concept-what is left after the limitations on the freedom of
states have been determined constitutes the content of sovereignty.
In the context of natural resources, "permanent sovereignty" raises some
interesting questions, if it is to be understood in any substantive legal
sense. One is reminded unavoidably of the initial intimate relationship
42
between ownership and sovereignty.
40.
41.

12 MIDDLE EAST EcoN. DIGEST 279
CATTAN, LAW 19-30.

(1968).

42. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927), reprinted in
11. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOcIAL ORDER

45 (1933). Dr. Mughraby's incidental treat-
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The difficult legal problems which arise concerning oil concessions
relate to the basic frame of legal reference, not to details of implementation or incidental interpretation. It is essentially the conflicting demands
of states and companies for repeated revision and continuing security of
expectations that are ultimately involved in the somewhat formal debates
one finds in the literature on "the law applicable to" concession agreements. Dr. Mughraby tackles the issue of revision directly. He states:
[t]he principles governing revision of concession agreements may be invoked under two distinct sets of circumstances:
1. Where a gross inequality of bargaining power had
prevailed at the time of signing the agreement leading to a
state of unequivalent contractual advantages.
2. Where changes in circumstances render such terms of
already executed concession agreements impracticable, or necessitate the addition of new terms without which the equivalence
of the contractual advantages is greatly impaired. 3
On reflection, it would seem that the first category clearly fits only
the cases of manifest inequity brought about through the operation of the
colonial system. All other situations would come under the second
category: in a business situation, it is most difficult to determine fairness
or equity without reference to time, the position, aspirations and skill
of the parties, and the economic and technological background. What is
fair reward for financial risks under widely varying conditions cannot be
fixed with any degree of certainty or consensus. The terms of reference
are thus continuously changing. Faced with changing (indeed escalating)
demands on the part of the host countries, in a context of changing
internal (political, psychological) and external conditions (markets,
transport, technology, even utilization), we must seek to determine
equity, equivalence, and fairness in concreto, with respect to the particular situation at the time claims are made-not looking back to correct
past conditions. What is then needed is a legal frame of reference that
will provide maximum flexibility to all parties-adaptation to changing
objective conditions, reasonable stability of expectations, and avoidance
of catastrophic crises. It is because of this felt need that suggestions have
been advanced for the creation (or recognition-a clearly "constitutive"
recognition in this case) of a "new" body of law (more precisely, a new
body of international law),"' called by some authors "transnational"
ment of the state as landlord and sovereign is a rather oversimplified reference to a
complicated and jurisprudentially significant topic. MUGHRABY 191, 194.
43. MUGHRABY 176.
44. For a discussion of the alternatives in that respect and strong support for the
public international law character of the law in question, see W. FRIEDMANN, THE
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law,4" founded on the "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."
Such a body of law serves several functions. Its most obvious, but
not most important, function would be to make available to those
concerned a set of legal principles for application in situations where the
domestic law of the host state is still undeveloped in the relevant area.
Some of the most influential essays in this area48 and three out of the
four cases47 that can be said to recognize the applicability of such a body
of law appear to be primarily founded on such an understanding of its
function. In the past few years, however, the situation has been changing
very fast in the less developed countries. In the oil law area, for instance,
most oil producing Middle Eastern states have by now enacted comprehensive petroleum statutes.4" This trend will continue unabated, if not

intensified. Although extensive gaps will surely continue to exist in the
laws of many less developed countries-at the very least familiarity and
usage will be lacking in some areas of the law-this cannot be the
principal rationale for a "transnational" law of the type under discussion.
The second function of such a body of law would be to enhance the
security of foreign investors by establishing certain standards for the
treatment of their contractual and other rights. It would thus indirectly
serve the host countries' interests, as well, by encouraging responsible
investors rather than speculators and by rendering unnecessary the grant
of special, rigidly binding, guarantees and assurances. Transnational
law is thus expected to fulfill in part the functions of the traditional
"minimum standard of international law," but it would do so more
effectively precisely because it lies outside the rigid formal structure of
traditional international law.
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

170-81 (1964).

45. Recent usage of this term is, of course, attributable to the influence of
Philip Jessup's Tranmiational Law (1956). The present context may be somewhat
different from his; cf., A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS

283-95 (1962) ; G.

HAIGHT,

The Development of TransnationalInvestment Law Through

International OrganiLations, in

SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PRIVATE INVESTORS
ADROAD-STRUCTURES AND SAFEGUARDS 99 (V. Cameron ed. 1966); Lalive, Un recent
arbitragesuisse enb;'e un organisie d' tat et une socijtj privie 6trangjre, 19 ANNUAIRE
SuIssE DE DR. INT'L 273, 284-302 (1962) ; Lalive, Contracts between a State or a State

Agency and a Foreign Company-Theory and Practice: Choice of Law in a New Arbitration Case, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 987, 998-1002, 1006-11 (1964). See also, in the more
traditional international law context, K. BORCHERS, VERTRAGE VON STAATEN IIT AusLANDISCHEN PRIVATPERSONEN 164-68 (1966); C. AMIERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INJURY TO ALIENS 116-19 (1967) ; and cf. the detailed elaboration in a particular context by Philippe Kahn in an article to be published in Volume 44 of the Indiana Law
Journal.
46. See, especially, McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by
Civilised Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT. L. 1 (1957).
47. Cases cited in notes 2, 3 and 4 supra.
48. CATrAN, EVOLUTION 20-22. And Cf. MUGHRABY 116.
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Both authors studied view the problem in a manner not significantly
departing, at first blush, from the one given here, although neither of
them adopts the "transnational law" label, as to which I too have now
some doubts. Dr. Mughraby treats the subject quite incidentally and
briefly, indeed surprisingly so, in the narrow context of choice of law
clauses in joint venture agreements. 9 He concludes that the various
"indications" on applicable law "may serve to put certain limitations on
the application of local law to certain cases ....

and to establish certain

international standards of justice with which the local law is required to
comply. . . ."" Dr. Cattan discusses the matter at greater length" '
and concludes that "resort to general principles of law in oil concessions
has an auxiliary or residuary character" and that this tends to make the
2
concept "a residuary 'common law' of certain classes of State contracts."
The matter does not end here, however. Apparent agreement on the
functions of transnational law is often misleading. The existence of
such a body of law is suggested by various writers for different reasons.
There is, no doubt, some basic agreement. Most supporters of
the concept would agree that, through its continuing application to state
contracts, transnational law will presumably develop reasonably precise
and certain standards and criteria. Moreover, because of its limited
special area of application, it should succeed in developing principles and
procedures designed to promote the continuing cooperation of the parties
rather than limiting itself to sterile apportionment of blame and damages
after the fact. It should reflect, that is, the actual degree of flexibility and
readiness to negotiate and compromise that oil companies and host
governments have generally shown rather than the rigid legalisms of the
rhetorics from either side.5"
Agreement even on these features is possible because there is no
concrete reference to substance. When the substantive principles of such
law are considered, it becomes clear that the law's essential purposes are
conceived differently by its several advocates. Under one view, such a
body of law should be accepted as existing because it would help to
temper the rigid application of contractual provisions and it would make
possible the application of equitable concepts. Under other views, such a
body of law, if applicable, would tend to give to the concession contract
even a stronger role than it has now. It would tend to make relationships
more "stable," sc. rigid. The two positions are not only distinct but often
49.
50.
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51. CATrAw,
52. Id. 68.
53.
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opposed. While the agreement as to the existence (or desirability)
of transnational law remains valuable, it is not helpful to disregard or
confuse these basic differences of opinion in order to reach a non-existing
substantive consensus.
It is in this context that the much debated analogy between oil
concessions and contrats administratifs acquires its significance. Dr.
Cattan discusses this question in a peculiar manner, by inquiring into
the possible applicability of droit adrninistratif,i.e., administrative law
French style, to oil concessions. 4 He then takes great pains to point out
that there is no such body of law in many of the legal systernis involved.
What he seems to miss throughout this exercise is that the application of
a legal concept by analogy does not involve adoption or application of a
whole branch or system of law. Admittedly, not all jurists who have
dealt with this matter approach it in precisely the same manner and,
unfortunately, Dr. Cattan fails to identify the authors he is answering.
The nearest to an assertion that oil concessions are contrats administratifs that I have been able to find is in a paper by a Libyan jurist submitted to the Fifth Arab Petroleum Congress. 5 But even there it is admitted that the local law overrides the author's theoretical observations on
the "nature" of the contract. Where the point is advanced in a less
polemical spirit, it takes the form of a suggestion of analogy."
What is suggested is that the operative principles of the law of
government contracts, found most clearly in French administrative law
but by no means absent in their substance in other legal systems, should
be applicable to oil concessions and other similar agreements. Dr. Cattan
joins issue, somewhat indirectly, with that position, by pointing at the
several differences between the "public service concessions," which are
typical administrative contracts in French law, and the oil concessions in
Middle Eastern countries." But, first of all, the concession de service
public is not the only administrative contract in French law; other instruments, such as public works contracts (marchs de travaux publics)
54. CATTAN, LAW 72-86.
55. N. SAID, THE LEGAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACT, in

NATURE OF A PETROLEUM CONCESSION CONTRACT AS AN
PETROLEUM CONGRESS (Cairo 1965). Similar
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assumptions can be found in other papers sube.g., O.P.E.C., FRoM CONCESSIONS TO CONTRACTS,
(Cairo 1965); S. AILAm, STATE CONTROL OVER
I
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have been unable to locate the, by now legendary, papers by Mr. Frank Hendryx,
submitted to the First and Second Arab Petroleum Congresses, 1959 and 1960, which
seem to defend a related thesis, although references to and quotations from them have
appeared in much of the abundant literature in response and rebuttal printed, and on
occasion reprinted, in the United States.
56. See, e.g., A. FAToURos, supra note 45, at 196-209; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note
44, at 200-06.

57.

CATTAN, LAW

75-83.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
and supply contracts (marchis de fournitures), are also classed in that
category and they differ considerably from Dr. Cattan's chosen example.
In the second place, the precise criteria for the distinction between
administrative and private-law contracts in French law cannot be applied
literally and out of context in other systems and situations. To argue,
for instance, that while administrative contracts must contain "regulatory
clauses" which can be altered unilaterally by the state, oil concessions do
not include such clauses and their provisions "can be varied only by the
mutual consent of the parties,""8 is to mistake conclusion for premise.
If the matter were already that clear on the face of the contract, there
would be no need for analogies. Thirdly, to support the analogy one must
refer to basic principles and point out that certain important features
which are present in the administrative contract concept, as developed by
French legal theory, also obtain in the case of oil concessions: the relationship between the state qua sovereign and the private contracting party, the
need for establishing between the two a system of continuing relationships of cooperation and not a sequence of one-shot transactions,"0
and the importance of the relationship for the operation of the governmental machine-although the degree of importance of oil concessions for
the host state is far higher than in most of the often routine contracts
covered by the French theory.
In the final analysis, no analogy is ever fully compelling in and by
itself. There is always a choice between analogies (as between legal
principles) and one decides on the basis of an assessment of the relevance
of various criteria and a judgment as to the desirability of the consequences that flow from adoption of the one or the other possible analogy.
What at least some supporters of the contrat administratif analogy are
suggesting is that the legal consequences which follow from this manner
of perceiving the issues are preferable to those that follow from an
understanding of the oil concession in purely or predominantly contractual (private-law-contractual) terms. In other words, it is not because
the analogy is compelling that one accepts the legal consequences but
because one considers the consequences appropriate that one adopts the
analogy. This is elementary (even over-simplified) legal realism, but one
should not lose sight of simple truths when dealing with complex subjects.
What is particularly attractive about the legal effects which flow
from the adoption of the contrat administratif analogy is that they appear
to provide and account for a reasonably well-delimited orderly process of
58. Id. 79.
59. For the role of the principle of cooperation between state and private contracting party, see, 2 A. DE LAUBAD-RE, TRAITL THfORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES CONTRATS
ADmiNISTRATIFS 18-21 (1956).
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legal change, in an area where social change is fast-paced as well as
inevitable."0 It must be admitted that even in the absence of such a
theoretical construct the parties would eventually adjust their relationship to changing conditions, as they have in fact done in the recent past.
However, a legal approach or theory which can make explicit, account
for, and indeed assist the process of change is to be preferred over an
approach that relegates change to non-legal factors and processes. An
illustration of the difference between the two approaches is found in the
treatment of the concept of "mutual equivalence of contractual advantage"
by the two authors under review. No doubt, this is a fluid and ambiguous
term, incapable of clear or stable definition. It is in fact a legal standard,
which merely points to certain areas and tests and establishes them as
relevant or significant. By itself, in the abstract, it provides no answer.
For Dr. Mughraby, this concept constitutes the "basic jurisprudential
content" of the law of "permanent sovereignty."'" Recognizing the inherent difficulty of the principle, he seeks to provide some concrete
guidelines for its implementation.62 These guidelines, however, not only
are far too summary and incomplete but also rest on the assumption of
the existence of some indeterminate "decision-making bodies" which may
"take the form of arbitration tribunals, conciliation commissions, administrative courts or the OPEC High Court."6 Far more elaboration in
concreto, perhaps in part through study and reformulation of past
developments, in addition to current proposals or negotiations, is needed
to render the concept operational.64 Still, the author at least tries to
gTapple with this issue and to account for related past and future developments. Dr. Cattan, on the other hand, devotes a short chapter to the discussion of this issue (in which Dr. Mughraby's book is rather
surprisingly not cited), and reaches opposite conclusions. He maintains
that the fifty-fifty arrangements between investors and host countries
have introduced this principle in practice, but according to him
the introduction of the principle of equivalence of benefits in
oil concessions did not possess any legal significance. Such
60. Perhaps it should be added that social change in this area is also radical and
continuous. Conbra, G. HAIGHT, .mpra note 45, at 103, who argues that "social change
does not necessarily change law." His examples, however, show clearly that he is
referring to temporary and non-radical changes. This is a matter of degree, of course,
but then so is everything else, at least in matters legal.
61. MUGHRABY, 161; and cf. id. 161-201. It is in this context only that Dr.
Mughraby refers to the analogy with the contratadministratif ; cf. id. 184-90.
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64. In this connection, the insights from Canadian law contributed by Professor
A. R. Thompson are quite useful; Thompson, Sovereignty and Natural ResourcesA Study of CanadianPetroleum Legislation, 1 VALPARIso L. Rxv. 284 (1967).
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equivalence was neither required by any legal system nor
dictated by any legal consideration. But the adoption of this
principle has shown that the parties to oil concession agreements
were not unmindful of practical and equitable considerations."
A final inquiry should complete this journey into petroleum law and
lore and, most appropriately, bring us back to the point made at the very
beginning of this review. How relevant are these problems and considerations to transactions, investments, and relationships other than
those relating to oil? In particular, how applicable is "transnational law"
to such other areas? The answer must be speculative, since the little
authority there is and most of the debates relate, directly or indirectly, to
petroleum. It would seem that transnational law as here understood would
be clearly applicable to relationships arising out of mineral concessions,
where conditions, as to order of magnitude, technology, processing, and
marketing, are grosso modo similar to those in petroleum. Large-scale
"economic development agreements,"6 even if not primarily involving
mineral or other natural resources, probably present enough similarities
to fall in the same general category. Some problems arise as to mediumsize manufacturing investments, undertaken on the basis, of formalized
undertakings usually founded on foreign investment or industrial promotion legislation. In most cases involving such investments the domestic
law of the host state would be applicable. However, if transnational law
is understood to be not a complete and elaborate body of law but a set of
"residuary" principles importing certain standards of justice and fairness
for both parties, there is no reason why even such investments would not
come under it. The incidence and extent of utilization of this law in such
cases might be much lower than with respect to natural resources or largescale investments but that in itself is not too significant. A far more difficult question is how far such law might be applicable or even relevant to
relations between developed states and foreign corporations or individuals. Logical consistency (the virtue of small minds, but also of
egalitarians) would dictate that it should apply, but it is difficult to
imagine the precise conditions for such application. One can only lamely
65.
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66. This concept, as used by Lord McNair, supra note 43, Hyde, Economic
Development Agreenents, 103 HAGUE ACADEMy OF INT'L L., RECUEIL DES CoURs 271
(1962), and W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 44, at 177, usually involves exploitation of
natural resources. But it is not necessarily synonymous with "agreement for the development of natural resources" (is an oil concession an "economic development agreement"?)
and, in some instances, the magnitude of the undertaking, its long-range character, and
other such features may be sufficient to bring it in that category, even though the
relationship to natural resources is not predominant. The conventions d'itablissement
of francophonic African states, for instance, would seem to be clear cases of "economic
development agreements," whatever their precise content.
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conclude with the observation that much more study and speculation
on the needs and possibilities for use and development of what has been
called transnational law are needed.
A. A. FATouRost
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The task Johnstone and Hopson set for themselves is monumental.
THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND.

They seek to determine the goals for the legal profession; to present a

picture of its work and specializations; to offer alternatives for providing
legal services; and to describe the legal profession in England, primarily
as a mirror which might point up the strengths and weaknesses of the
American legal system. Their primary purposes are to identify the
problems of the legal profession and to suggest solutions to some of them.
Lawyers are a powerful and important group in this country. Their
influence is felt in every sector of national life, from entertainment to
industry, from the family to the government. What lawyers do is,
therefore, important to all of us. But what they do is not easy to describe,
because lawyers are involved in many different tasks and work in and
with a great variety of organizations. The city solo practitioner,' for
example, is usually, because of different origins and types of practice,
isolated from the large firm lawyer.2 The former takes what is often
considered the leftovers of the law: criminal, divorce, and negligence
work; the latter can be selective.
While there are a number of studies, mainly researched by sociologists,3 which describe the work of lawyers, none of these examinations
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. J. CARLIN, LAwvRas oN THEIR OWN (1962).
2. E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER (1964).
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Development of the Negro Lawyer, 1958 (unpublished doctoral dissertation in University
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dissertation in University of Chicago Library) (young lawyer) ; W. Thielen, Socialization Processes Among Law Students, 1965 (unpublished doctoral dissertation in Columbia
University Library) (student lawyer); Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice,
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